"H+/-: Transhumanism and its Critics"

"Transhumanism" is seldom mentioned in discussions concerning the posthuman in literary and cultural theory. Katherine Hayles, with her critique of our cultural condition of "virtuality," in which we privilege information over the material locations in which it is instantiated, is perhaps an exception to this observation. Indeed, in her essay, "Wrestling with Transhumanism," she writes, "transhumanism for me is like a relationship with an obsessive and very neurotic lover. Knowing it is deeply flawed, I have tried several times to break off my engagement, but each time, it manages to creep in through the back door of my mind. In How We Became Posthuman, I identified an undergirding assumption that we will soon be able to upload our consciousness into computers and leave our bodies behind. I argued that this scenario depends on a decontextualized and disembodied construction of information" (215).

Hayles goes on to observe that "there are, of course, many versions of transhumanism, and they do not all depend on the assumption I critiqued. But all of them… perform decontextualizing moves that oversimplify the situation and carry into the new millennium some of the most questionable aspects of capitalist ideology" (215).

Whether or not we agree with the latter part of Hayles claim, H±: Transhumanism and its Critics, presents a series of essays by transhumanist and posthumanist thinkers that explores the “many versions” of transhumanism.

How to define "transhumanism"? Oxford professor and transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom offers the following influential definition:

Transhumanists view human nature as a work-in-progress, a half-baked beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable ways. Current humanity need not be the endpoint of evolution. Transhumanists hope that by responsible use of science, technology, and other rationale means, we shall eventually manage to become posthuman, beings with vastly greater capacities than present human beings have. (29)

"Transhumans," then, represent an intermediary stage between the human and the posthuman. The transhuman community is involved in envisioning an evolutionary path for the transhuman into its posthuman future, using emerging NBIC (nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive sciences) developments to better the human, while at the same time avoiding the "existential risks" (to use Bostrom’s phrase) posed by these converging technologies.

The sixteen advocates and critics of transhumanism whose essays are collected in the book seem to agree that transhumanism represents an outgrowth of the Enlightenment project of humanism and secular rationalism characterized as "attempts by science and technology to improve the human condition" (Tirosh-Samuelson 32).  When viewed from its origins in Western secular humanism, "transhumanism is not as novel as it seems, since all of us are already augmented beings if we take into consideration the many technological advancements over the centuries that have transformed who we are. Thus, agriculture, writings, postal services, navigation, calculus, antibiotics, radio, television, photography, and computers are all technological innovations that have shaped who we are, and it is reasonable to assume that we will continue to be augmented by future technologies. So long as transhumanism simply advocates the nineteenth-century commitment to progress and alleviation of human suffering, it is hard to critique it" (32).

The question becomes much more complex when transhumanists start talking about changing human "nature" in radical ways. Among their most sought-after changes are radical life extension, increased intelligence, and the digitization (and thus indefinite preservation) of mind and consciousness. Futurologists such as Ray Kurzweil also imagine that we can use nanotechnology to clean and restore the environment.


I don’t necessarily wish to advance an argument for or against transhumanism here. Rather, I want to comment briefly on how H±: Transhumanism and its Critics, as its title suggests, does a wonderful job of presenting both sides of the issue.  The book is divided into four parts:

I. A critical historical perspective on transhumanism
II. H+ proponents of transhumanism
III. H± point-counterpoint
IV. H- critical perspectives on transhumanism

In Section I, Hava Tirosh-Samuelson presents a thoughtful and thorough overview of the intellectual and scholarly terrain surrounding both "transhumanism" and "posthumanism." Like transhumanism, there is no singular posthumanism, and Tirosh-Samuelson enumerates the differences between transhumanism as a social movement and posthumanism as a postmodern philosophical critique of the human subject.

Section II offers six essays that present the transhumanist project and defend it against detractors. Perhaps the most interesting feature of transhumanism is that, in a certain sense, it operates against the notion of an essential human self. Precisely because there is no natural or innate self, because we cannot derive a human essence from Nature, transhumanists argue that we can and should use science and technology to improve the human condition as well as individual human beings. It’s very difficult to argue against this position without resorting to what Nick Bostrom calls "bioconservatism," or a critique of human modification based on an appeal to a fixed biological nature.

Section III offers three chapters that argue against transhumanism while seeking to avoid essentialist trap. Each chapter is immediately followed by a rebuttal from an advocate of transhumanism. I must admit, the critics of transhumanism are often guilty of creating rhetorical strawmen and mischaracterizing their opponent’s positions, and the transhumanists miss no opportunity to point this out.  One particularly interesting justification for transhumanism comes from Max More, who insists on "morphological freedom," or, the ability of “each of us to alter and improve (by our own standards) the human body” (143). It seems as if at least some transhumanists would then be sympathetic to the varying "permutations of the human" advocated for by Judith Butler. In fact, at least one transhumanist in the volume presents transgender people as pioneering transhumans.

Section IV features critical perspectives on transhumanism, including Katherine Hayles essay, "Wrestling with Transhumanism." The problems with transhumanism discussed are numerous, but in general focus on the neoliberal ideology that underlies the movement and its insistence on individual freedom divorced from social, political, and ecological contexts.

In short, I found the rich and contested definition of "transhumanism" presented by the text incredibly useful in continuing to explore the topographically-varied terrain of the posthumanities.